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A RECONSIDERATION OF THE RELEVANCE
AND MATERIALITY OF THE PREAMBLE IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Milton Handler,* Brian Leiter** and Carole E. Handler***
At a time when the bicentennial of the Constitution is being
widely celebrated, it is appropriate to reconsider the role of the preamble in constitutional adjudication. For two centuries the preamble

has been the most neglected feature of our organic charter. While
almost every other provision has been subjected to exhaustive analysis
and a rich and often long history of judicial construction, the preamble has been surprisingly ignored by the overwhelming majority of
commentators' and relegated to sheer irrelevance by the courts.2
Though it is understandable that the courts, on the few occasions
on which the question has arisen, have accorded no substantive effect
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1924, LL.B. 1926, Columbia
University; LL.D. (honoris causa) 1965, Hebrew University; LL.D. (honoris causa) 1990, Columbia University; Member, New York Bar.
We are grateful to Professors Paul A. Freund, Gerald Gunther, Albert J. Rosenthal,
Louis Henkin and the late Robert B. McKay for their comments on an earlier draft.
** Regent's Fellow and Candidate for the Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, University of
Michigan-Ann Arbor. A.B., Princeton University, 1984; J.D., University of Michigan, 1987.
Member, New York Bar.
0* A.B. 1957 Radcliffe College; J.D. 1975 University of Pennsylvania. Member, California
and .Pennsylvania Bars.
I The preamble is neither analyzed nor discussed in a wide array of commentaries and
case books. See, e.g., P. Brest & S. Levinson, Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking (2d
ed. 1983); G. Gunther, Constitutional Law (11 th ed. 1985); W. Lockhart, Y. Kasimar, J.
Choper & S. Shiffin, Constitutional Law (6th ed. 1986); R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young,
Treatise on Constitutional Law (1986); G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet,
Constitutional Law (1986); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988). But see
infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (discussion of the preamble by early commentators);
see also S. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 51-53 (1984) (arguing for relevance of the
preamble as an interpretive aid); Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 Colum. L.Rev. 1103, 1106-08 (1986) (relevance of the preamble); Carrasco &
Rodino, "Unalienable Rights," the Preamble, and the Ninth Amendment: The Spirit of the
Constitution, 20 Seton Hall L. Rev. 498 (1990) (relevance of the preamble, especially to the
ninth amendement). More than thirty-five years ago, William Crosskey was a persistent-but
solitary-proponent of the relevance of the preamble. See 1 W. Crosskey, Politics and the
Constitution in the History of the United States 365-66, 374-79 (1953); 3 W. Crosskey & W.
Jeffrey, Jr., Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 16-18 (1980).
Crosskey argued that "the effect of the Preamble, under the [interpretive] rules of the time [the
late eighteenth century], was to assure to the government that the Constitution was creating
powers filly adequate, on a national scale, to all the 'objects' for which governments commonly were formed." 1 W. Crosskey, supra, at 374.
2 See infra note 9.
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to the preamble,3 it is difficult to comprehend why they (as well as the
commentators) have failed to turn to the preamble as an aid to the
proper construction of the constitutional text. As an authoritative recital of the Constitution's purposes and the intent of its framers, the
preamble would seem well-suited to playing a useful role in constitutional interpretation; a role, moreover, that is not at all unusual or
unfamiliar. In fact, as we endeavor to demonstrate below, the fate of
the preamble in constitutional jurisprudence is inexplicably anomalous when compared to the well-established interpretive significance
accorded preambles and preamble-like provisions in the construction
of other legal instruments.
That the preamble has been improperly excluded from the process of constitutional interpretation would hardly seem worth noting,
however, unless the recognition of its relevance might have influenced, albeit modestly, the course of judicial decision in the past and
could be of assistance to the Court in the future in the resolution of
increasingly difficult questions of constitutional interpretation. That
it should have had and can have such an effect is our belief and the
theme of this paper. Indeed, one would expect that this too would be
the view of each of the major schools of constitutional construction.
For the interpretivist, the preamble would seem to possess significance
as explicit language of the document; for the noninterpretivist, as relevant evidence of the document's broad purposes and values; and for
the originalist, as a statement of the framers' "intent."4 But in fact,
each of these schools has ignored the preamble.
In developing our thesis, we examine in Part I of this article the
fate of the preamble in the courts. While the courts have declared
that no substantive right or power derives from the preamble, this
defensible conclusion 5 has effectively chilled almost all reliance on the
preamble in interpreting the Constitution. 6 In Part II, we demonstrate just how anomalous a phenomenon this is by examining the
well-established rules of construction involving preambles and analogous provisions in contracts, statutes, and treaties. Interestingly, even
early commentators on the Constitution, we show, envisioned an office for the preamble in constitutional jurisprudence similar to that of
preambles under the common law-a role unhappily never thereafter
realized.
3 See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.

4 For further discussion of these points, and our understanding of these schools of interpretation, see infra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.

5 But see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
6 But see infra note 14 for cases that do employ the preamble.

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 118 1990 - 1991

1990]

MATERIALITY OF THE PREAMBLE

In Part III, we turn to the broader question of how the Constitution should be read. Drawing on the writings of the Constitution's
framers as well as of legal and jurisprudential writers of the same or
proximate eras, we show that they conceived of the Constitution as a
legal document subject to familiar common-law principles of interpretation and adjudication: inclusion and exclusion, expansion and contraction, case-by-case determination, and other forms of necessary
and historically warranted interpretive dynamism. Construed thus
dynamically and in the common-law tradition, the Constitution has
the elasticity which its preamble contemplates and which, like the development of common-law principles, enables it to cope with new
problems, arising at different times under ever-changing conditions
and circumstances. 7 This is what we argue in Part IV, where we suggest how some important constitutional issues might be determined
using the preamble not for any substantive principles but for the direction and guidance its eloquent statement of the charter's goals and
purposes can provide.
I.

THE PREAMBLE AND THE COURTS

The preamble of the Federal Constitution reads:.
WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.'
Although the Constitution begins with this unequivocal invocation of
noble ideals and goals, the courts, throughout our history, have been
9
reluctant to accord any force to this initial declaration of purpose.
In truth, however, the courts' disdain for the preamble is selective. Courts, for example, will frequently note that ultimately sovereignty resided in the people of the United States as attested to by the
7 See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.

By referring to the Constitution's elasticity, we are not in any way endorsing the rewriting
of its text in the untrammelled discretion of the Justices; rather by invoking the analogy of the
development of common law principles, we focus on the interpretations of the charter's provisions whose words and phrases are frequently couched in generalities .and whose application to
the facts of specific cases requires judicial construction.
8 U.S. Const. preamble.
9 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905); United States v. Boyer, 85
F. 425, 430-31 (W.D. Mo. 1898); United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 535, 539
(W.D. Okla. 1934), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1935).
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preamble's beginning, "We the people." 1 But this reference has always been more of a rhetorical flourish than an effort to ascertain
concrete entitlements or protections under the Constitution.
By contrast, courts considering an issue bearing in some way on
the preservation or promotion of national security will hold that such
an objective clearly falls within constitutional bounds by reference to
the preamble's language that the Constitution was established in part
to "provide for the common defence." 1 Unlike the words "We the
people," the courts' invocation of the "common defence" language
does figure in the determination of substantive constitutional questions. But if courts are willing to invoke the "common defence" provision of the preamble in the context of adjudicating the
constitutionality of acts and legislation bearing on national security,
they have demonstrated no such willingness with respect to the language seemingly applicable to the most contentious issues in recent
constitutional adjudication: 12 those pertaining to questions of liberty,
welfare, and, to a lesser extent, justice.1 3 There have been exceptions.
For example, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 14 the due process rights of welfare
10 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
11 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 612 (1985) (upholding prosecution of
draft registration register); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Int. Res. Group, 468 U.S.
841, 861 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (upholding
draft registration procedures that tied financial aid for students to registration); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (upholding presidential proclamation providing for military trials for
enemy agents found within U.S. during time of war).
12 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13 It should be noted that the language concerning the establishment of "justice" has generally been construed as referring to the establishment of a judiciary and the provision thereby
of procedural justice. See, e.g., 1 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 482 (1833); Chayes, How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1026 (1988).
14 397 U.S. 254 (1970); see McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 246 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("j]ustice-in the sense of procedural due process-is denied where a State makes
inadmissible evidence designed to educate the jury on the character and propensities of the
accused. Ohio does just that;" in a footnote to the word "U]ustice," Justice Douglas noted
that, "[i]t
is commonly overlooked that justice is one of the goals of our people as expressed in
the [p]reamble of the Constitution.. ." and he went on to quote the preamble. Id. at n. 17.
Note, however, that Justice Douglas, like some other commentators, see supra note 13, construes the "justice" mentioned in the preamble to refer to proceduraljustice); see also Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (ninth amendment "includes customary, traditional, and time-honored rights.., that come within the sweep of 'the Blessings
of Liberty' mentioned [as an interpretive aid] in the preamble to the Constitution").
Since 1825 (the handful of pre-1825 cases are discussed infra note 45), the preamble's
language concerning liberty, justice or welfare has only been employed substantively in approximately two dozen Supreme Court cases. In almost two-thirds of these cases, the preamble is mentioned only by the dissent. In only one-sixth of the cases does the majority opinion
refer to the preamble. Moreover, only four justices (Black, Douglas, Burton and Field) are
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recipients to a pretermination evidentiary hearing were upheld, the
court observing that "[p]ublic assistance... is not mere charity, but a
means to 'promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.' "15
The classic expression, however, of the significance attached to
the preamble is Justice Harlan's opinion in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.1 6 In a case involving the constitutionality of a state vaccination
law, the Justice rejected the suggestion that "the particular section of
the statute of Massachusetts now in question.., is in derogation of
rights secured by the [p]reamble of the Constitution of the United
States." He observed that:

Although that [p]reamble indicates the general purposes for which
responsible for over half of these references. For other examples, see, e.g., Young v. United
States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 817 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 852 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. 111, 113 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755 (1948) (Burton, J.); Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 338 (1946) (Burton, J., dissenting); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S.
581, 608 (1900) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 716 (1888) (Bradley,
J., dissenting); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 296 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting); Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410-11 (1856) (Taney, C.J.). We should be very pleased if
other scholars would conclude that the references to the preamble in this body of cases, contrary to our reading, supports the view that the Supreme Court does accord interpretive significance to the preamble. After all, that is what we are contending in this article. We would
rather find that the Court is in agreement than chide it for its neglect.
The preamble appears, however, to have enjoyed a similarly limited currency in the lower
courts over the past 165 years. It has been discussed or relied upon in approximately two
dozen cases, usually by the majority. It should be noted, though, that in approximately 20%
of these cases, the court merely used the language of the preamble in a concluding paragraph
or summation, and not as an interpretive aid. For cases using the preamble as an interpretive
aid (with varying degrees of success), see Bissonette v. Haig, 800 F.2d 812, 818 (8th Cir. 1986)
(en banc) (dissent), aff'd, 485 U.S. 264 (1988); Wiggins Bros., Inc. v. Department of Energy,
667 F.2d 77, 88 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); NLRB v.
Highview, Inc., 590 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1979); Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840, 844 (8th
Cir. 1977) (concurrence), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978); LeFlore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d
933, 955 (5th Cir. 1970) (dissent); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 838 (1948); Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137, 140 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943); Berry v. School Dist., 467 F. Supp. 695, 709 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
Brown v. Moore, 428 F. Supp. 1123, 1143 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd mem., 575 F.2d 298 (5th Cir.
1978); In re DeToro, 247 F. Supp. 840, 843 (D. Md. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. DeToro v.
Maryland, 390 U.S. 992 (1968); Hill v. County Bd. of Ed., 232 F. Supp. 671, 676 (E.D. Tenn.
1964); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 90 F. Supp. 397, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); United States v.
Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903, 906-07 (S.D. W. Va. 1944); United States v. Hirabayashi, 46 F.
Supp. 657, 661 (W.D. Wash. 1942); Leahy v. Kunkel, 4 F. Supp. 849, 850 (N.D. Ind. 1933);
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Town of Calhoun, 287 F. 381, 385 (W.D.S.C. 1923); Day v.
Buffington, 7 F. Cas. 222, 227 (C.C.D. Mass. 1871) (No. 3,675), aff'd sub. nom. Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870); Seavy v. Seymour, 21 F. Cas. 947, 953 (C.C.D. Maine
1871) (No. 12,596).
IsGoldberg, 397 U.S. at 265.
16 197 U.S. 11 (1905); see also discussion infra note 19 and accompanying text.
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the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never
been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on
the Government of the United States or on any of its Departments..
Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of
the Constitution and such as may be implied from those so
granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the
Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the
sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power
can be exerted to that end by the United States unless, apart from
the [p]reamble, it be found in some express delegation of power or
in some power to be properly implied therefrom. 7

This view has been reiterated by other courts.18
It is important to note that what these courts hold is actually
uncontroversial and perfectly consistent with its rules of construction
for analogous legal documents. The narrow holding of the Supreme
Court in Jacobson and of the various federal district courts is that no

substantive rights are conferred by the preamble by itself. In fact,
these courts neither reject nor even consider what role the preamble
might play as an interpretive aid or guide; they are likewise silent on
the possibility that substantive rights might be derived from the preamble, not by itself, but as read, for example, in conjunction with the

fourteenth amendment. 19
Nonetheless, the narrow holding, as expressed in Jacobson, has,
in effect, "chilled" almost all judicial reliance on the preamble. 20 The
Jacobson court's unequivocal rejection of the preamble as a source of
rights has effectively discouraged most courts from considering the
17

Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.

Is See, e.g., United States v. Kinnebrew Motor Co., 8 F. Supp. 535, 539 (W.D. Okla. 1934),

cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1935) (discussing Jacobson and remarking that "there is no such
thing as the 'Welfare Clause' of the Constitution"); Hart Coal Corp. v. Sparks, 7 F. Supp. 16
(W.D. Ky.), rev'd, 74 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1934), which discusses Jacobson and observes that:
[i]t would hardly seem necessary to demonstrate the fallacy of the claim that there
is any inherent or general power unmentioned in the Constitution to accomplish
the purposes set forth in the preamble to that instrument. It would seem perfectly
apparent that the objects set forth in the preamble were intended by the fathers to
be attained through the exercise of the powers granted to the national government
in the Constitution ....
Id. at 27; See also Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, S.C., 10 F. Supp. 854, 870
(W.D.S.C.), modified, 12 F. Supp. 70 (W.D.S.C. 1935); United States v. Weirton Steel Co., 10
F. Supp. 55 (D. Del. 1935); Missouri Utils. Co. v. City of California, 8 F. Supp. 454, 459 n.2
(W.D. Mo. 1934); Amazon Petroleum Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 5 F. Supp. 639, 647-48
(E.D. Tex.), rev'd sub nom. Ryan v. Amazon Petroleum Corp., 71 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1934), rev'd
sub nom. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United States v. Boyer, 85 F. 425,
430-32 (W.D. Mo. 1898) (rejecting contention that preamble's provision for the "general welfare" grants substantive right to enact legislation toward that end).
19 See infra notes 131-222 and accompanying text.
20 But see supra note 14 for exceptions to this general tendency.
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preamble in any context in which21any contentious issues arise concerning liberty, justice or welfare.
Perhaps the current attitude is best summed up by Professor Edward L. Rubin who, after quoting the preamble's language that the
Constitution was established to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to
great
ourselves and our Posterity," remarked that, "It would require
22
daring to derive any specific meaning from this phrase."
But while-it may require "great daring" to derive "specific meaning" from any phrase in the preamble alone,2 3 the question remains
whether familiar rules of construction and interpretation do not compel the rescue of the preamble from its current desuetude in our constitutional jurisprudence.

II.

"PREAMBLES"

IN COMMON-LAW INTERPRETATION

In this section we seek to demonstrate that the disregard of the
preamble as an authoritative statement of the purposes and goals of
the Constitution represents a dramatic departure from the interpretive significance accorded preambles and preamble-like provisions in
other legal documents. We consider, in this regard, the recital clauses
of contracts, legislative declarations of purpose in statutes, and the
preambles of treaties--each of which serves to articulate the purpose
of the document and the intent of its makers. We can discern no
reason why their rules of construction should not obtain in the constitutional context and are fortified in our conclusion by noting that this
was precisely the view of earlier and knowledgeable commentators
and jurists.
A.

Contracts

Private contracts typically begin with clauses often called "recital
clauses," sometimes called preambles, and frequently beginning with
the word "whereas." These clauses may describe the goals and purposes of the contract or explain its major conditions or obligations.
21 Note, again, that the invocation of the preamble's provision for "common defence" has
not been similarly chilled. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
22 Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 1044, 1089 n.233
(1984); see also, Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 NY.U. L. Rev. 353, 371 & n.109
(1981) (noting that the idea of the preamble being "judicially enforceable" "appear(s] farfetched").
23 Since liberty rights recognized by the Court are derived from the due process clause of
the fifth amendment and, so far as the states are concerned, from the fourteenth amendment, it
is far from clear to us why "great daring" was not equally necessary when specific meaning
was found in the similar language of these amendments.
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The question that concerns us is what significance courts generally
assign to these introductory recitals.

The basic rule of construction is straightforward: a court may
look to a recital clause for aid in interpreting the substantive provisions of the contract when those provisions are ambiguous.24 The
opinion of the Indiana court in Stech v. Panel Mart25 is typical.
There, the court relied on a 1924 Indiana Supreme Court opinion
holding that:
The preliminary recitals in a contract may be persuasive in determining the intention of the parties thereto when the language expressing their contractual relations is ambiguous, uncertain and
indefinite, but they should never be allowed to control, as here, the
clearly expressed stipulations of the parties.26

The Stech court went on to qualify this principle with the observation
of the Indiana Supreme Court in a 1949 opinion that,
The preliminary recitals of the contract may be of some value, but
they are not contractual, and can not be permitted to control the
express27provisions of the contract which are contractual in
nature.
Concurring with these principles of construction, the Stech court further observed that "a court must construe the instrument as a whole,
giving effect to every portion, if possible," and that, as a consequence,
"'If the recitals are clear and the operative part is ambiguous, the
recitals govern the construction." "'28
24 See, e.g., Stech v. Panel Mart, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Nassif v.
Boston & Me. R.R., 340 Mass. 557, 563, 165 N.E.2d 397, 401 (1960) ("Doubtless, the recitals
of the preamble [to the contract] may be used to assist in interpreting other parts of the contract, but, as such, they impose no obligations .... "); Berg v. Berg, 201 Minn. 179, 189, 275
N.W. 836, 842 (1937). See also United States v. Howland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 108, 111-12
(1819) (counsel) (giving preamble of recital clauses interpretive significance even in absence of
ambiguity); Abraham Zion Corp. v. Lebow, 761 F.2d 93, 103-04 (2d Cir. 1985); Schaffran v.
Mount Vernon-Woodberry Mills, Inc., 70 F.2d 963, 965 (3d Cir. 1934); Wilson v. Towers, 55
F.2d 199, 200 (4th Cir. 1932); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 F. Supp. 293, 301
(D. Minn. 1957); Kingwood Oil Co. v. Bell, 136 F. Supp. 229, 240 n.15 (E.D. Ill. 1955) ("Resort will be had to the recitals of the contract if necessary to determine the intention of the
parties and operating provisions thereof."); Shipman v. General Transistor Corp., 22 Misc. 2d
632, 634-5, 198 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (Sup. Ct.) ("recitals to the agreement... 'may be resorted
to as indicating the intention of the parties and the meaning and scope of the agreement' "),
aff'd mem., 12 A.D.2d 529, 207 N.Y.S.2d 734 (2d Dep't 1960). See generally E. Farnsworth,
Contracts § 710.10 (1990).
25 Stech, 434 N.E.2d at 97.
26 Id. at 100 (quoting Irwin's Bank v. Fletcher Say. & Trust Co., 195 Ind. 669, 694, 145
N.E. 869, 877 (1924)).
27 Id. (quoting Kerfoot v. Kessener, 227 Ind. 58, 79, 84 N.E.2d 190, 199 (1949)).
28 Id. (citing Maddux & Sons v. Trustees of Ariz. Laborers, 125 Ariz. 475, 478-79, 610
P.2d 477, 480-81 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Barkley, 165 N.Y. 48, 57, 58 N.E. 765, 767
(1900)) (citation omitted).
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Similarly, in Berg v. Berg,2 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court

quoted approvingly the opinion of a West Virginia court:
It seems to be quite clear that paragraphs in a contract containing

recitals of the purposes and intentions of the parties thereto are not
strictly speaking parts of the contract, unless adopted as such by

reference thereto. The obligation[s] of the parties to each other are
not fixed by the terms of these recitals, and the only purpose
thereof is to define or limit the obligations which the parties have

taken upon themselves where the extent thereof is uncertain, or to
aid in interpreting any ambiguous language used in expressing such
obligation. Such preambles or recitals in a contract are analogous
to the preamble in a statute. It is no part of the statute, but frequently it is looked to in determining the proper construction of
the act. It ordinarily declares the mischief which it is the intention
of the Legislature to correct by the passage of the act, and thus
offers valuable aid in construing a statute ambiguous on its face.
And so in contracts where a preamble of this character is added
declaratory of the purposes and intentions of the parties, it will be
looked to in construing the contract, and to supply any omissions
therefrom which are capable of being supplied by reference to such
recitals, but in no sense will it be the basis of a legal and binding
obligation of the parties.3"

In sum, two basic rules of construction apply when courts are
construing the recital clauses of contracts:
1. Contracts are to be construed as a whole; and
2. Where substantive provisions are ambiguous, recital clauses
may be used to fill in terms or clarify meanings or purposes.
The recital clause, then, is an interpretive aid, one that is subsidiary to the main text of a contract, but that may be properly invoked
to construe ambiguous provisions, and thereby impose obligations
upon and create entitlements for the parties.
B.

Legislative Declarationsof Purpose

Many statutes begin with a legislative declaration of purpose, 3 '
and a large number of courts have addressed the question of what role
such declarations play in the interpretation of the statute. The answer
to this question, however, can only be understood in the context of a
general rule of interpretation: that courts should effectuate the legislature's intent in construing statutory provisions.3 2 A legislative decla29 Berg v. Berg, 201 Minn. 179, 275 N.W. 836 (1937).
30 Id. at 189 (quoting Martin v. Rothwell, 81 W. Va. 681, 683-84, 95 S.E. 189, 190 (1918)).

31 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).

32 See, e.g., Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Intepretation
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ration of purpose is, then, a way of ascertaining the legislature's
intent. Consequently, courts uniformly take the view that a legislative
declaration of purpose is an important interpretive aid.3 3
in the Supreme Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 892, 894 & n.18 (1982) (noting that under current
doctrine,. "legislative intent [is] the 'touchstone' of statutory decisions" (citing Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 25 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part))). Many cases express the same point. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) states that when
reviewing an agency's construction of a statute
[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress .... If a ourt ... ascertains that Congress had an intention... that
intention is the law and must be given effect.
Id. at 842-43 & n.9; see also, Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United
States Dep't of Labor v. Forsyth Energy, Inc., 666 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir. 1981) ("In interpreting a statute, this court's function '. . . is to give effect to the intent of Congress.' ");
Environmental Defense Fund v. Colorado Dep't of Health, 731 P.2d 773, 776 (Colo. Ct. App.
1986) ("The fundamental rule of statutory construction is to determine the General Assembly's intent and, if possible, to give effect to every word of the statute by reading the act as a
whole. A reviewing court must liberally construe general provisions of the statute to give full
effect to the General Assembly's intent.") (citation omitted); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 535 (1947) ("The Court no doubt must listen
to the voice of Congress."). But see infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for framers'
view of intent and how it is to be ascertained.
33 A North Carolina court stated that
It is elementary that the controlling principle in the interpretation of a statute is
that it must be given the meaning which the Legislature intended it to have. Thus,
when the Legislature has erected within the statute, itself, a guide to its interpretation [in the form of a "declaration by the Legislature of the policy to be accomplished by the act"], that guide must be considered by the courts in the
construction of other provisions of the act which, in themselves, are not clear and
explicit.
In re Watson, 273 N.C. 629, 632, 161 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1968) (citations omitted); see also, EEOC v.
First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982) (interpreting the word
"employee" in a way to make it consistent with declared purpose of Age Discrimination in
Employment Act), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Smith, 664 F.
Supp. 1228, 1236 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that Federal Railway Safety Act preempted municipal ordinances by reading relevant section of Act in conjunction with the "Congressional
statement of statutory purpose" as establishing Congressional intent to effect such preemption); Globe Fur Dyeing Corp. v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 177, 180 (D.D.C. 1978) ("congressional purpose or declaration of policy set out in the preamble of a statute provides a sound
and thoroughly acceptable basis for ascertaining the goals of the statute, e.g., United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1973)"), aff'd mem., 612 F.2d 586
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Uline v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 28 Misc. 2d 1002, 1004, 213
N.Y.S.2d 871, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ("Although legislative declaration of the purpose and intent
of a statute cannot control the judgment of the court, it is entitled to great weight as an aid to
interpretation of such statute."); Hamrick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 270 S.C. 176,
180, 241 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1978) ("The purpose of... no fault coverage has been declared in
the statute itself and must be considered in interpreting the statute."). An exception of sorts to
the general rule is found in Smith v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n, 410 Mich. 231, 234,
301 N.W.2d 285, 289 (1981), which held that "'[w]here a statute expresses first a general
intent, and afterwards an inconsistent particular intent, the latter will be taken as an exception
from the former and both will stand' (following language of N.W.2d)." While this does not
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Thus, purpose generally, and a legislative declaration of purpose

in particular, are important and proper aids in interpreting statutes.
The main difference from the rule for contracts is that courts place
less emphasis on the need for the statutory language to be ambiguous
before appeal to a legislative declaration of purpose is warranted a4
Resort to the legislative purpose as declared in the statutory preamble
is generally permissible without a threshold determination that the
language of the statute itself is ambiguous.
C.

Treaties

The rule of construction governing the preambles of treaties is
analogous to the comparable rule for contracts (althougk-the issue

here has come up much more infrequently than in the case of contracts or statutes). In Citizens Band of PotawatomiIndians v. United
States,a for example, the court observed that "where the words of a

treaty are not clear or unambiguous, we should review both the history and the purpose of the Article in question in an effort to deter.
mine its true meaning. "36 The court went on to note that one aid in
this search would be "the treaty preamble. 3 7 Thus, for treaties, as
for contracts, ambiguities in the text of the document may be resolved

by reference to preamble clauses.
D. Application of Common-Law Rules of Construction to the
Preamble of the Federal Constitution
For contracts, statutes and treaties we may adduce the following
five general rules of construction:
First, preambles are not independent sources of obligations or
rights;
expressly contradict the general rule as expressed by the authorities cited above, it does suggest

that a declaration of.purpose can not trump a contrary purpose in the body of a statute.
Rather, the rule is that the contrary purpose will stand in that particular statutory provision,
while elsewhere in the statute the declared purpose will continue to operate as an interpretive
aid.
34 But see In re Watson, 273 N.C. at 632, 161 S.E.2d at 5. Earlier cases also take a different view, treating the preamble of a statute as an interpretive aid only when the provisions in
the body of the text are ambiguous. See, e.g., Beard v. Rowan, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 301, 317 (1835)
("The preamble in the act may be resorted to, to aid in the construction of the enacting clause,
when any ambiguity exists."); United States v. Webster, 28 F. Cas. 509, 512 (D. Me. 1840)
(No. 16,658).
35 179 Ct. Cl. 473 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1046 (1968).
36 Id. at 482.
37 Id. at 483. For other cases employing a treaty preamble as an interpretive aid, see, e.g.,
Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 607, 671-18 (1927); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119
U.S. 1, 30 (1886); Westar Marine Servs. v. Heerema Marine Contractors, 621 F. Supp. 1135,
1139 n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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Second, these instruments are to be construed as a whole;
Third, the purpose of legislative or private documents is relevant
to their interpretation, particularly when portions of the documents
are ambiguous;
Fourth, preambles can be guides to purpose and hence helpful in
interpretation;
Fifth, preambles can also be useful when particular provisions in
the body of a document are ambiguous (independent of whether the
preamble illuminates purpose).
Constitutional jurisprudence agrees with common-law rules of
construction on the first and third points; that is, it is accepted that:
i) a preamble is not an independent source of obligations or
rights; 38 and
iii) purpose is significant in construing the document.
however, with respect
Constitutional jurisprudence is anomalous,
3
to the second, fourth, and fifth points: 1
ii) in not construing the Constitution as a whole but, instead,
largely ignoring the preamble;
iv) in ignoring the preamble as a relevant source of purpose; and
v) in not referring to the preamble in order to construe ambiguous provisions in the constitutional text.
For convenience of reference, let us call these, respectively, the
Wholeness Rule, the Purpose Rule and the Ambiguity Rule; and let

us say what each of these would require of constitutional
jurisprudence:
a) The Wholeness Rule requires that no part of the Constitution
be overlooked in interpreting the Constitution, including, of course,
its preamble;
b) The Purpose Rule requires that the preamble be consulted as
evidence of the Constitution's purpose (and the intent of its framers)
when the purpose of the Constitution is relevant to the construal of a
particular provision;
c) The Ambiguity Rule requires that the preamble be consulted
when construing ambiguous provisions of the Constitution in an effort
to fix their meaning in particular cases.
The Wholeness Rule, by itself, is plainly the least significant; it is
the other two rules that tell us what the interpreter should try to do
with the preamble once he agrees to consider the document as a
38
39

See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1-23 and accompanying text.
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whole, including its preamble. 40
It might be objected, of course, that common-law rules of interpretation have no place when it comes to the Constitution. We reject,
however, the notion that constitutional interpretation is different from
the common-law principles discussed above. We can find no reason
for exempting constitutional interpretation from a methodology
whose wisdom had been repeatedly demonstrated in countless common-law adjudications. 1
In fact, early commentators on the Constitution, steeped as they
were in common-law methods of interpretation, 42 conceived of a role
for the preamble similar to that described for contracts, statutes, and
treaties and encapsulated in the Wholeness, Purpose and Ambiguity
Rules.
Thus, Justice Story in his Commentaries43 writes that:
The importance of examining the preamble, for the purpose of
expounding the language of a statute, has been long felt, and universally conceded in all juridical discussions. It is an admitted
maxim in the ordinary course of the administration of justice, that
the preamble of a statute is a key to open the mind of the makers,
as to the mischiefs, which are to be remedied, and the objects,
which are to be accomplished by the provisions of the statute. We
find it laid down in some of our earliest authorities in the common
law ....
There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or
constitution of government, an equal attention should not be given
to the intention of the framers, as stated in the preamble. And
accordingly we find that it has been constantly referred to by
statesmen and jurists to aid them in the exposition of its
provisions."
Story's basic thesis-that the preamble had a familiar and proper role
to play in the construal of the Constitution-accords perfectly with
the familiar common-law principles discussed above.4 5 In keeping
40 Note, of course, that the Purpose Rule naturally takes precedence over the Ambiguity
Rule: for as long as purpose is relevant, and the preamble is evidence of purpose, then the
preamble may be properly consulted, whether or not a particular provision is ambiguous.
41 There is even less reason for this difference given what we argue in Part III-that the
Constitution was a document written by lawyers and intended to be construed in the manner
familiar to common-law lawyers.
42 See especially infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
43 See J. Story, supra note 13.
44 Id. at §§ 459-60.
45 Story only cited Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Id. at § 460 & n.1.
But in fact, there were a couple of decisions (but only a couple) in the first generation after the
adoption of the Constitution that did employ the Preamble as an interpretive tool. See, e.g.,
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 381,(1822) (Marshall, C.J.); M'Culloch v. Mary-
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with these, Story went on to observe that, "[t]he preamble ...cannot
confer any power per se .... Its true office is to expound the nature,

and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by the
constitution, and not substantively to create them.""

Similarly, Fortunatus Dwarris, in his seminal work on statutory

interpretation, 47 observed that "[t]he preamble [of a statute], is enti-

tled to great consideration. It is, indeed, that introductory statement
. .. to which both reason and authority point, for ascertaining the
intention of the enactment."4 And Platt Potter (a justice of the

Supreme Court of New York), in his edition of Dwarris's treatise,
goes on to write in perhaps hyperbolic but telling terms:
Perhaps, in the history of American jurisprudence and of
American fundamental law, there is no single paragraph that possesses more profound significance, in the expression of the object
and intent of the instrument, and of its framers, than that of the
preamble to the federal constitution. The highest judicial authority
ever accords to it[49] a significance becoming an instrument which
was laying the deep foundations of a national government for
American empire which should rest on the solid basis of the will of
an intelligent and a free people; the highest original source of all
legitimate earthly authority.
This preamble expresses the whole spirit of the instrument;
and while it is never resorted to to enlarge the powers confided to
the general government, or to any of its departments; and though it
confers no power, per se, it has ever been referred to, and has been
used for the purpose, as its true office would seem to be, to exland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 475 (Jay,
C.J.). The preamble was also employed by counsel in argument in a few other cases. See, e.g.,
Bryan v. Woodcock, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 374, 377-79 (1815); M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 381. For
other later cases employing the preamble, see supra note 14.
46 J.Story, supra note 13, at § 462. See also § 422:
But a constitution of government, founded by the people for themselves and
their posterity, and for objects of the most momentous nature, for perpetual union,
for the establishment of justice, for the general welfare, and for a perpetuation of
the blessings of liberty, necessarily requires that every interpretation of its powers
should have a constant reference to these objects. No interpretation of the words
in which those powers are granted can be a sound one which narrows down their
ordinary import so as to defeat those objects.
Id.
47 F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes: Their Rules of Construction, and the
Proper Boundries of Legislation and of Judicial Interpretation. With American Notes and
Additions By Platt Potter (1871).
48 Id. at 107. See also, T. Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules Which Govern the Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 43 (2d ed. 1874) ("as Lord Coke
and Lord Bacon say, the preamble is a key to open the understanding of a statute").
49 Potter neglected to cite any evidence for this proposition.
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pound and express the nature, extent, and application of the pow-

ers conferred in the constitution itself.
...

Here is found condensed, the reasons which have ever had

their influence upon reflecting judicial minds in giving construction
to this great fundamental law, the sheet anchor of our political

hopes. 50
What for Story and Potter was natural--common-law wisdom applied to constitutional interpretation resulting in the rule that the pre-

amble should be consulted to "expound and express the nature,
extent, and application of the powers conferred in the constitution

itself"-has unfortunately not been the way in which the Court itself
through the years has regarded the opening words of the document."
Yet as Chief Justice Marshall noted, "[i]t cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect." 5 2 Perhaps it is time, then, that this anomalous treatment of the Constitution's preamble come to an end. We consider now what difference

this might make in our constitutional jurisprudence.
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMON LAW

In asserting the relevance of the preamble, we do not align our-

selves with any particular school of constitutional interpretation. In
fact, the preamble, in our view, can be invoked to buttress all three of
the

currently

dominant

constitutional

theories (interpretivism,

noninterpretivism, and originalism). For interpetivists, constitutional
interpretation must be firmly grounded in the language of the document, the structure of government it creates, or the document's his50 F. Dwarris, supra note 47, at 266-67. See also T. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest Upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American
Union 11 (4th ed. 1878) (using the preamble to show "[t]he general purpose of the
Constitution").
51 See supra notes 16-21, 43-50 and accompanying text.
Again, there have been a handful of exceptions. See Wiggins Bros., Inc. v. Department of
Energy, 667 F.2d 77, 88 (Temp. Emerg. Ct. App. 1981) ("In the construction of the Constitution of the United States, statutes and regulations, the federal rule permits and requires consideration of preambles in appropriate cases."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); United States v.
Boyer, 85 F. 425, 430 (W.D. Mo. 1898) ("the preamble to the constitution... may be properly
referred to for the purpose of correctly construing that instrument"). These are the decisions
which in our view should be controlling. Weagree with Judge Gewin's well worded dissent in
Leflore v. Robinson, 434 F.2d 933, 955 (5th Cir. 1970) (Gewin, J., dissenting), withdrawn on
other grounds, 446 F.2d 715 (1971):
The preamble to the Constitution does not purport to guarantee individual rights,
but it does set forth what this union of states is all about. It does not limit the Bill
of Rights but it does serve as a key to an interpretation of the responsibilities
involved as well as the rights therein conferred and secured.
52 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
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tory. 53 As Professor John Hart Ely writes: "judges deciding
constitutional issues should confine themselves to enforcing norms
that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution."' 4 In
short, the judge should look to "the general themes of the entire constitutional document and not... [any] source entirely beyond its four
corners."" Interpretivism, in fact, encompasses both strict constructionism and originalism, 56 though without according a priority to intent in the manner of the latter. Since the essence of interpretivism,
however, is always a concern for the document itself, plainly the charter's prefatory words ought not to be ignored.
Noninterpretivists, by contrast, hold that constitutional interpretation may often transcend the explicit language of the text to give
effect to the underlying values and purposes that animate the Constitution and that ensure its continued vitality two hundred years after
its framing. 57 Professor Ely succinctly characterizes this view as follows: "courts should . . .enforce norms that cannot be discovered

within the four corners of the document. "' s Similarly, Professor
Thomas Grey has described noninterpretivism as the "acceptance of
the courts' additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of
individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these
ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution." 5 9 Despite his differences with the interpretivist, it would
seem that the noninterpretivist, too, in his pursuit of larger background values and purposes should be able to find important aid in
the preamble's expression of the broad aims of the Constitution.
Moreover, the noninterpretivist has more immediate need of the
preamble than either the interpretivist or originalist. For the familar
complaint against noninterpretivism is that it represents an usurpation of legislative authority by the judicial injection of purely "personal" values into the Constitution.' The preamble, as we argue
See, e.g., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); Monaghan, supra note 22.
J.Ely, supra note 53, at 1.
55 Id. at 12.
56 See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind.LJ.1,
17 (1971).
57 See R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); M.
Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, And Human Rights (1982); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703 (1975); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30
Hastings L.J. 957 (1979); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1033
(1981). For criticism of the "noninterpretivist" label, see Dworkin, The Forum of Principle,
56 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 469, 472 passim (1981).
58 J.Ely, supra note 53, at 1.
59 Grey, supra note 57, at 706.
60 See, e.g., Bork, supra note 56, at 3-6; Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
53
54

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 132 1990 - 1991

1990]

MATERIALITY OF THE PREAMBLE

below,6 1 enables the noninterpretivists to respond to such a charge by
identifying themselves with the values set out in the preamble.
Finally, originalists contend that constitutional intepretation is to
be guided by the intent of the framers.62 As former Attorney General
Ed Meese put it:

Our belief is that only the sense in which the Constitution was
accepted and ratified by the nation, and only the sense in which
laws were drafted and passed provide a solid foundation for adjudication. Any other standard suffers the defect of pouring new
meaning into old words, thus creating new powers and new rights
totally at odds with the logic of our Constitution and its commit-

ment to the rule of law.63
Elsewhere, Meese has characterized his "jurisprudence of original intention" as seeking "to discern the meaning of the text of the Constitution by understanding the intentions of those who framed,
proposed, and ratified it. The intentions of the Framers supply us
with our original principles.""M Similarly, Robert Bork has advocated
"deriving [as] rights from the Constitution... [only those] specific
values that text or history show the framers actually to have intended
and which are capable of being translated into principled rules."'6
Yet it is precisely the purpose of a document's preamble-in a constitution or otherwise-to disclose the values intended by its makers. 66
Certainly one interested in original intent cannot ignore that the framers wanted to promote the general welfare and to secure the blessings
of liberty for themselves, their children and their children's children.
What would be the consequence if all three schools of constitutional interpretation were to accept the relevance of the preamble? It
surely would not lead to agreement on all (or perhaps even many)
matters of substantive constitutional doctrine and theory-and we do
not contend otherwise. Rather, acceptance of the interpretive import
Tex. L. Rev. 693, 706 (1976). For an important and persuasive response to these sorts of
criticisms, see Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43
(1989).
61 See infra notes 92-123 and accompanying text.
62 See, e.g., R. Berger, Government By Judiciary (1977); Bork, supra note 56; Monaghan,
supra note 22.
63 Meese, The Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27
S. Tex. L. Rev. 455, 466 (1986) [hereinafter Bulwark]; see also Meese, The Attorney General's
View: Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 Pub. Admin. Rev. 701 (1985).
64 Lecture by Attorney General of the United States Edwin Meese, III, at the University of
Dallas (February 27, 1986) (quoted in Bulwark, supra note 63, at 466 n.60).
65 Bork, supra note 56, at 17; see also Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, 7 Humanities 22 (1986); R. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law

(1990).

66 See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
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of the preamble should at least lead everyone to concur with the
oft67
quoted words of Justice McKenna in Weems v. United States:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is peculiarly true of constitutions.6"
It is to this important conclusion that we believe the preamble most
directly speaks: for a document that begins with the affirmation that it
is ordained and established in order to achieve a range of basic and
very general goals-"Justice," "domestic Tranquility," "general Welfare," "the Blessings of Liberty"-is simply not plausibly construed
as if its specifics are frozen in the realities of a world as it existed two
centuries ago. 69
Justice McKenna's view has, of course, been endorsed by many
other jurists. Among those who have quoted approvingly from Justice McKenna's opinion in Weems are Justice Brennan,7' Justice
Harlan,71 Chief Justice Warren,72 Justice Goldberg,73 Justice Brandeis74 and Justice Blackmun." Other judges have also expressed the
same basic view in slightly different terms. Perhaps the most famous
67 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910). Justice McKenna, it should be noted, was appointed by President McKinley, and served on the Court during the first quarter of this century, one of its most
conservative eras. See 266 U.S. v-viii (1925). No one has ever accused him of being a liberal
activist.
68 Justice McKenna concluded:
They [constitutions] are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occa.
sions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it." The future is their
care and provisions for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy
can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule, a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and
power. Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in
reality. And this has been recognized The meaning and vitality of the Constitution
have developed against narrow and restrictive construction....
Weems, 217 U.S. at 373 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
69 See Chemerinsky, supra note 60, at 92. We take up this and related issues about the
significance of the preamble in Part IV.
70 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 263-64 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
71 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 347 n.2 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).*
72 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 564-65 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
73 Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889, 890 n.3 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
74 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-73 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
75 Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2919 & n.19 (1989).

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 134 1990 - 1991

1990]

MA TERIALITY OF THE PREAMBLE

and familiar formulation is that of Chief Justice Marshall in
M'Culloch v. Maryland.7 6 More recently, Justice Jackson has noted
that:
[s]ome clauses [of the Constitution] could be made almost unworkable, as well as immutable, by refusal to indulge some latitude of
interpretation for changing times. I have heretofore, and do now,
give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity afforded by
what seem to be reasonable, practical implications instead of the
rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire textualism."
Similarly, Justice Cardozo admonished repeatedly against the pitfalls
of mechanical judging and its companion, a static conception of law.
"The good of one generation," warned Cardozo, "is not always the
good of its successor. '7' Thus, "[d]ecisions founded upon the assumption of a bygone inequality [are] unrelated to present-day realities, and ought not to be permitted to prescribe a rule of life."' 79 As to
constitutional issues, Cardozo rightly noted that "[u]nique situations
can never have their answers ready made as in the complete letterwriting guides or the manuals of the art of conversation. Justice is not
to be taken by storm. She is to be wooed by slow advances."' 0 In
short: "[t]he great generalities of the constitution have a content and a
significance that vary from age to age.""1 As Cardozo concluded, in
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Marshall wrote:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the
public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be
marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves. That this
idea was entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only to be
inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the language.... In considering this question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding.
Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
Similarly, Justice Brennan has observed that: "many of the Constitution's most vital imperatives are stated in general terms and the task of giving meaning to these precepts is therefore left to subsequent judicial decisionmaking in the context of concrete cases." United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 932 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
78 B. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 84 (1924) [hereinafter B: Cardozo, Growth].
79 Id. at 105-06.
80 Id. at 133.
81 B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 17 (1921) [hereinafter B. Cardozo, Judicial Process]; see also B. Cardozo, Growth, supra note 78, at 82-83. After reviewing the evolution of the concept of "liberty" protected by the Constitution (id. at 76-81)--what he called a
"fluid and dynamic conception" (id. at 81)-Cardozo concluded that:
Courts know today that statutes are to be viewed, not in isolation or in vacuo, as
76
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language particularly apposite here:
A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing
hour, but principles for an expanding future. In so far as it deviates from that standard, and descends into details and particulars,
it loses its flexibility, the scope of interpretation contracts, the
meaning hardens. While it is true to its function,
it maintains its
2
power of adaptation, its suppleness, its play.1
These in short are the views, not merely inspired and sanctioned
by the preamble, but in truth compelled by it. But for all the distinguished jurists who have joined in affirming the sentiments expressed
by Marshall and McKenna, there have been perhaps as great a
number whose reading of the Constitution is the exact opposite. Justice Sutherland's views are typical of this opposed school of thought:
The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the
Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers and the people who adopted it....
The history of the times, the state of things existing when the provision was framed and adopted, should be looked to in order to
ascertain the mischief and the remedy. As nearly as possible we
should place
ourselves in the condition of those who framed and
83
adopted it.
Only three years later, reflecting no doubt his distaste for the turn the
Court was slowly taking, Justice Sutherland stated his conception of
the judicial function in even stronger terms:
[T]he meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb
and flow of economic events. We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be construed in the light of
the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up
of living words that apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be intended,
that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not
mean when written-that is, that they do not apply to a situation
now to which they would have applied then-is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force as the
people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have
pronouncements of abstract principles for the guidance of an ideal community, but
in the setting and the framework of present-day conditions, as revealed by the
labor of economists and students of the social sciences in our own country and
abroad.
Id. at 81.
82 Id. at 83-84.
83 (Emphasis added.) Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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made it otherwise.8 4

Similar sentiments were expressed eighty years earlier by Chief Justice
Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford.85 In our own day, this view is vigorously urged by several of the sitting justices, Edwin Meese, Robert
Bork, and others.8 6 Of the present members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist has perhaps been the most explicit on this point in his
87
well-known attack on the "notion of a living Constitution":
Once we have abandoned the idea that the authority of the courts
to declare laws unconstitutional is somehow tied to the language of
the Constitution that the people adopted, a judiciary exercising the
power of judicial review appears in a quite different light. Judges
then are no longer the keepers of the covenant; instead they are a
small group of fortunately situated people with a roving commission to second-guess Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning what is best for the
country. 88

More recently, Justice White has admonished his colleagues that their
substantive due process jurisprudence constitutes "judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution."8 9 In doing so, Justice White plainly
echoed the most persistent critic of such jurisprudence, Justice
Black.9 Typical of Justice Black's admonitions was his criticism of
what he called "natural law due process":
by which this Court frees itself from the limits of a written Constitution and sets itself loose to declare any law unconstitutional that
"shocks its conscience," deprives a person of "fundamental fairness," or violates the principles "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."... [T]his concept is completely at odds with the basic
principle that our Government is one of limited powers and that
such an arrogation of unlimited authority by the judiciary cannot
be supported by the language or the history of any provision of the
Constitution.9
84

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J.,

dissenting).

85 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405, 426 (1856).

See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
Rehnquist, supra note 60.
88 Id. at 698. See also Lusky, Universal Kinship and the Supreme Court, 11 Cardozo L.
Rev. 119 (1989).
89 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986).
90 Justice Black, of course, appeared to be guided more by an unrelenting literalism than
any contemporary form of originalism.
91 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 381-82 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see
also Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting):
It has become fashionable to talk of the Court's power to hold governmental laws
and practices unconstitutional whenever this Court believes them to be "unfair,"
86
87
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In short, the opponents of an expansive construction of the Constitution include a cast of spokesmen perhaps as long and distinguished as
those supporting the McKenna approach. Diversity of views is not
uncommon in our judicial system and having regard for the complexity and difficulty of the constitutional questions which the courts are
called upon to resolve, it is likely always to exist. However, the McKenna reading, in our judgment, comports more with the purposes,
goals and intent of the preamble than does that of Sutherland.
In this regard, we find it especially illuminating to consider how
the interpretation of the Constitution was originally conceived in the
early years of its history primarily because the original common-law
characterof the Constitution, stressed by the early commentators, has
been ignored by many modem scholars. Appreciation of the fact that
the Constitution was drafted by lawyers trained in the common-law
tradition will help in two respects. First, it will lend further support
to the relevance and materiality of the preamble as urged by us. And
second, it will support our contention-to which the preamble also
speaks-that the Constitution warrants a fluid and dynamic construction-precisely the sort common-law lawyers and judges are wont to
expect and provide for any legal text.
H. Jefferson Powell writes in his important article on The Original Understandingof Original Intent,92 that:
Most of the Americans influential in the framing, ratification, and
early interpretation of the federal Constitution were intimately familiar with the common law, and they gleaned from it not only a
general approach to constitutional interpretation .

.

. but also a

contrary to basic standards of decency, implicit in ordered liberty, or offensive to

"those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples .... " All of these different general and indefinable words or
phrases are the fruit of the same, what I consider to be poisonous, tree, namely, the
doctrine that this Court has power to make its own ideas of fairness, decency, and
so forth, enforceable as though they were constitutional precepts.... I cannot
accept the premise that our Constitution grants any powers except those specifically written into it, or absolutely necessary and proper to carry out the powers
expressly granted.
Id. (citations omitted).
92 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985) [hereinafter Powell]; see also Powell, The Modem Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513 (1987) [hereinafter Modern Misunderstanding]. We are aware that Professor Powell is not without his critics. See, e.g., Berger,
"Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 296 (1986); Clinton,
Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72
Iowa L. Rev. 1177 (1987). Having independently reviewed many of Professor Powell's sources
as well as other sources from this period, we tend to align ourselves with his scholarship. For
Professor Powell's response to Professor Berger, see Modern Misunderstanding, supra, at
1533-42. For Professor Berger's rejoinder, see Berger, The Founders' Views-According to
Jefferson Powell, 67 Texas L. Rev. 1033 (1989).
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variety of specific interpretive techniques."

For example, Justice Story observed that: "it can hardly be doubted,
that the constitution and laws of the United States are predicated
upon the existence of the common law.... [which is to be] appealed
to for the construction and interpretation of its powers. " 9 ' In the earliest years of the republic lawyers too made explicit their reliance on
common-law methods of interpretation and construction: "It is impossible to understand or explain the [C]onstitution without applying
to it a common law construction. It uses terms drawn from that science, and in many cases would be unintelligible or insensible, but for
the aid of its interpretation. "95
Like Professor Powell and Justice Story, we believe it is important to emphasize that the Constitution was written by common-law
lawyers who envisioned its being interpreted by judges trained in the
common law.9 6

In emphasizing this common-law character of constitutional law
Powell, supra note 92, at 901.02 (citations omitted).
94 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857). Story
pointed to the constitutional provision for criminal jury trial and noted that: "no person can
doubt, that for the explanation of these terms, and for the mode of conducting trials by jury,
recourse must be had to the common law." Id.; see also Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
95 United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336, 347 (1818) (counsel); see also T. Cooley, supra note 50, at 74.
96 Other scholars have also taken note of the common-law character of constitutional law.
See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204,
228-29 (1980); Sandalow, supra note 57, at 1034, 1039, 1055-56, 1072; see also, Frankfurter,
supra note 32; Llewelyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1934);
Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 Yale L.J. 221 (1973).
Professor Monaghan, it should be noted, uses the term "constitutional common law" in a
different sense from the way we do. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Foreword]. In Professor Monaghan's sense, constitutional
common law consists only in that "substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions... [and hence] subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress." Id.
at 2-3. Examples of such constitutional common law include the commerce clause cases, id. at
17, the Miranda warning, id. at 20-23, and the right to damages against federal officers who
violate the fourth amendment. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Foreword, supra, at 23. Professor Monaghan's conception of
constitutional common law turns importantly on distinguishing the rules of the latter from
"true constitutional rules" which are more clearly "related to the core policies underlying the
constitutional provision[s]." Id. at 33. While we do not want to deny that such a distinction
can often be properly drawn (particularly in the sorts of cases Professor Monaghan identifies),
we want to emphasize a very different sense in which the Constitution is the foundation of a
constitutional common law: its central provisions-and not simply related procedural or remedial rules--admit of evolution in the way legal terms do at common law. We develop these
points further below in the text. For discussion and criticism of Professor Monaghan's view,
see L. Tribe, supra note 1, at 36-37.
93
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and interpretation we mean to draw attention to those broad and familiar features of the common law derived from the writings of the
great commentators on that tradition like Cardozo and Llewellyn,
which though composed in a later period give expression to a conception of the common law that would have been recognizable in the
later part of the eighteenth century. 9 These writers of a later day
emphasized the inherently dynamic character of the common law,
epitomized by what Llewellyn called the "Grand Style" which "consists in a constant re-examination and reworking of a heritage, that
the heritage may yield not only solidity but comfort for the new day
and for the morrow."9' This is what Cardozo, too, identified as "[t]he
very strength of our common law, its cautious advance and retreat a
few steps at a time." 99 The common law proceeds through a process
of trial-and-error in which "principles themselves are continually
retested; for if the rules derived from a principle do not work well, the
principle itself must ultimately be re-examined."'' 0 By providing us,
then, with "the laboratory of the years"101 the common law permits
an "endless process of testing and retesting,... a constant rejection of
the dross, and a constant retention of whatever is pure and sound and
fine."" 2 As common-law lawyers-many of the first rank-the framers surely understood and were familiar with these general characteristics of the common law. In what follows, we explore the
consequences of this view for the Constitution they drafted.
A.

The Constitution and the Statutory Analogy

As Professor Powell has noted, "the Marshall Court followed the
path, staked out in the Constitution's first years, of applying tradi10 3
tional methods of statutory construction to that instrument."
The first and most striking feature of early common-law princi97 See B. Cardozo, Growth, supra note 78; B. Cardozo, Judicial Process, supra note 81; K.
Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (1960).
98 K. Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 36; see also, id. at 6, 38.
99 B. Cardozo, Growth, supra note 78, at 5-6.
100 B. Cardozo, Judcicial Process, supra note 81, at 23 (quoting M. Smith, Jurisprudence 21

(1909)).
101 Id. at 178.
102 Id. at 179. Cardozo quotes an illuminating remark by Justice Brandeis on the impor-

tance of the method of inclusion and exclusion to this process:
The process of inclusion and exclusion, so often applied in developing a rule,

cannot end with its first ennunciation. The rule as announced must be deemed
tentative. For the many and varying facts to which it will be applied cannot be
foreseen. Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law.
State of Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 236 (1924), quoted in B. Cardozo,

Growth, supra note 78, at 138.
103 Powell, supra note 92, at 942.
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ples of statutory interpretation was the great reliance on "common
sense." Alexander Hamilton, for example, wrote that:
The rules of legal interpretation are rules of common sense,
adopted by the courts in the construction of the laws.
... In relation to such a subject [a constitution of government], the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from
any technical rules, is the true criterion of construction.1" 4
This theme recurs again and again throughout the work of writers of
this period.103 One of its important consequences appears most
clearly, however, in a related interpretive principle: that the intent of
a legal document was to be ascertained from the words of the document itself, without recourse to external evidence. 6 As Hamilton
put it: "whatever may have been the intention of the framers of a
constitution, or of a law, that intention is to be sought for in the in-

strument itself, according to the usual & established rules of construction."1 7 And courts of that period took the same textualist approach.
For example, Chief Justice Marshall wrote:
[A]lthough the spirit of an instrument, especially that of a constitution, is to be respected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be
collected chiefly from its words. It would be dangerous in the ex104 The Federalist No. 83, at 559-60 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
105 Justice Story declares (plainly echoing Hamilton): "In relation, then, to such a subject as

a constitution, the natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any technical or
artificial rules, is the true criterion of construction." J. Story, supra note 13, at § 448. And
Dwarris writes that "Common sense and good faith, are the leading and principal characteristics of all interpretation." F. Dwarris, supra note 47, at 48.
106 See Powell, supra note 92, at 915; see also Brest, supra note 96, at 215 ("The practice of
statutory interpretation from the 18th through at least the mid-19th century suggests that the
adopters assumed-if they assumed anything at all-a mode of interpretation that was more
textualist than intentionalist").
107 A. Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 The
Papers of Alexander Hamilton 111 (H. Syrett ed. 1965). This traditional English common-law
view is well-expressed by Lord Reading in 94 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.) 232 (1934):
Neither the words of the Attorney General nor the words of an ex-Lord Chancellor, spoken in this House, as to the meaning intended to be given to language used
in a Bill, have the slightest effect or relevance when the matter comes to be considered by a Court of Law. The one thing which stands out beyond all question is
that in a Court of Law you are not allowed to introduce observations made either
by the Government or by anybody else, but the Court will only give consideration
to the Statute itself. That is elementary ....
Id., quoted in Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 540; see also 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on
the Laws of England 59 (1765 & photo. reprint 1979):
The fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is
by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the most
natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.
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treme, to infer from the extrinsic circumstances, that a case for
which the words of an instrument expressly provide, shall be exempted from its operation.... [flf, in any case, the plain meaning
of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same
instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the framers of
that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in
which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the
case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.° 8
If "common-sense" was to be the starting point for statutory construction and, in particular, for the construal of "intent predicated on
the wording of the instrument," then a dynamic element would appear to be built into the interpretation of legal texts. For there is an
inevitable accretion in the "natural and obvious" sense of provisions
in the course of successive adjudications throughout the years. This is
the essence of the common-law approach. The lawyers who drafted
the Constitution appear to have well-understood this consequence as
appears from what follows. Words and phrases, as we shall see, take
on a life of their own, their growth being entirely consistent with the
emphasis placed by Marshall on intent derived from the wording of a
written instrument.
B. ConstitutionalInterpretationand Interpretive Dynamism
By "interpretive dynamism" we mean simply the view expressed
so well by Justice McKenna in Weems:1° 9 that constitutional principles must be "vital" and flexible and that, accordingly, constitutional
108 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 (1810), quoted in Clinton,
supra note 92, at 1215. Professor Clinton goes on to suggest that Marshall did regard "intentionalism" as "one of several interpretive approaches properly employed when the language of
the document was susceptible to various interpretations." Id. at 1215 n.150. It is not clear,
however, from the evidence Professor Clinton cites, whether Marshall means for the "intention" to be ascertained from external evidence or from the language of the document itself.
But see id. at 1216-17 (Marshall's reliance on The Federalist in interpreting the Constitution).
Professor Clinton does, however, agree with Professor Powell that "originalism was not the
exclusive or predominant interpretive methodology [in the pre-Civil war era]. Powell, therefore, is clearly correct in suggesting that the principal interpretive focus of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth century was on textual exegesis and precedent rather than on histiographic interpretation." Id. at 1220. On the general problems with reliance on original intent, see, e.g., Brest, supra note 96; Sandalow, supra note 57, at 1050:
the past to which we turn is the sum of our history, not merely the choices made
by those who drafted and ratified the Constitution. The entirety of that history,
together with current aspirations that are both shaped by it and shape the meaning
derived from it, far more than the intentions of the framers, determine what each
generation finds in the Constitution.
Id.
109 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see, supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text.
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provisions should be interpreted dynamically to meet the needs of a
changing society. That a similar view was, in fact, shared by the common-law lawyers who framed the Constitution is suggested by three
general sorts of considerations.
First, the framers and earliest interpreters of the Constitution believed in what Professor Powell has aptly called "construction by usage and precedent": 1 ° that the meaning of terms would evolve in the
course of actual practice. Madison, for example, wrote that:
It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily used in
such a charter... and that it might require a regular course of
practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them. 1 1
Similarly, Chief Justice Marshall, in answering the question "has
Congress power to incorporate a bank?" remarked that:
[I]t is conceived that a doubtful question... if not put at rest by
the practice of the government, ought to receive a considerable impression from that practice. An exposition of the constitution, deliberately established by legislative acts, on the faith of which an
immense property
has been advanced, ought not to be lightly
disregarded. 112

Another court agreed, noting that in construing a constitutional provision "a court ought to rely for its true sense on a general practice
which has been so long submitted to."'113 Thus, the meaning of terms
was not magically locked in at the moment of drafting: the commonlaw lawyers who wrote the Constitution appreciated the need for
terms to acquire their sense through usage over the course of time.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the need for interpretive
dynamism arose from the very nature and language of the document
the framers drafted. As Chief Justice Marshall put it in Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux:114
A constitution, from its nature, deals in generals, not in detail.
Its framers cannot perceive minute distinctions which arise in the
progress of the nation, and therefore confine it to the establishment
of broad and general principles.
110 Powell, supra note 92, at 940.
111 Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), reprinted in 3 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 143, 145 (Philadelphia 1865), quoted in Powell,
supra note 92, at 941.
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
113 Adams v. Storey, 1 F. Cas. 141, 147 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817) (No. 66).
114 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
112
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Justice Story, writing more than a generation after the framers, gave
expression to a similar sentiment:
words from the necessary imperfection of all human language acquire different shades of meaning, each of which is equally appropriate and equally legitimate .... They expand or contract, not only

from the conventional modifications introduced by the changes of
society, but also from the more loose or more exact uses, to which
men of different talents, acquirements, and tastes from choice or
necessity apply them. No person can fail to remark the gradual
deflections in the meaning of words from one age to another; and
so constantly is this process going on that the daily language of life
in one generation sometimes requires the aid of a glossary in
another. 115
Justice Story's diagnosis of this necessary expansion and contraction
was in keeping with recognized common-law wisdom. Dwarris, for
example, had written that:
No human wisdom can prepare a law in such a form, and in
such simplicity of language, as that it shall meet every possible
complex case that may afterward arise....

And as time wears on,

and the wants and habits of society become changed, as they ever
will change with the progressive march of intelligence, especially in
a land enjoying the blessings of civil and religious freedom; the interpretations, suitable to a past age, will become more and more
impracticable to the present, as to all new questions.
These are propositions so well confirmed by experience, that
statesmen and lawyers now agree upon the wisdom of preparing
such instruments [statutes] with general outlines, in language clear
and easily understood, rather than of attempting minute details,
however elaborately extended .... 116

That the framers and earliest interpreters of the Constitution
shared in the general sentiments expressed so much later by McKenna is suggested, thirdly, by their views on the propriety of liberal
115 J. Story, supra note 13, at § 452 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter, writing a century later, gave pithy expression to this same sense of expansion and contraction: "like currency, words sometimes appreciate or depreciate in value." Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 538.
116 F. Dwarris, supra note 47, at 50-51.
It has been shown that it is impossible to word laws in such a manner as to
absolutely exclude all doubt, or to allow us to dispense with construction, even if
they were worded with absolute (mathematical) precision, for the time for which
they were made; because things and relations change, and because different interests conflict with each other.
Id. at 51; see also Frankfurter, supra note 32, at 528 ("If individual words are inexact symbols,
with shifting variables, their configuration can hardly achieve invariant meaning or assured
definiteness"); Sandalow, supra note 57, at 1035 ("the questions for which subsequent generations have sought answers in the Constitution have been the questions of those generations").
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construction. Hamilton, for example, in his Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank asserted that "powers contained in a constitution of government . . . ought to be construed
liberally, in advancement of the public good."""7 Dwarris gave expression to a related common-law sentiment: "Let all such judicial
determinations bear the impress of good faith, with liberal views of
construction in favor of civil liberty.""' In this regard, Dwarris followed Lieber, who had earlier written:
Let everything that is in favor of power be closely construed; everything in favor of the security of the citizen, and the protection of
the individual, be liberally and comprehensively interpreted; for
the simple reason, that power is power, and therefor able to take
care of itself, as well as tending by its nature to increase, while the
citizen may need protection." 9
Perhaps a particularly noteworthy example of this expansive view regarding civil liberties is one of Hamilton's arguments against including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Hamilton wrote:
"We, the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this
constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better
recognition of popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms
which make the principle figure in several of our state bills of
rights, and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics
than a constitution of government. 20
While this was hardly the typical argument of those early opponents
of a Bill of Rights,' it is significant that Hamilton, one of the most
important framers, would have accorded even substantive significance
to the preamble. While his view as to whether the Bill of Rights
should be included in the Constitution did not ultimately prevail, his
point is surely worthy of note: that the preamble itself testifies to the
intent of the framers to provide a constitutional guarantee of a multitude of liberties, liberties that need not be set out in enumerated form
in order to be protected by the system of government the document

creates.
Because of the common law's emphasis on the future (not the
A. Hamilton, supra note 107, at 105.
I18 F. Dwarris, supra note 47, at 49.
"9 F. Lieber, Lieber's Political Hermeneutics ch.6, § 10 (n.d.), quoted in F. Dwarris, supra
note 47, at 49.
120 The Federalist, supra note 104, No. 84, at 578-79 (A. Hamilton).
121 See, e.g., R. Morgan, James Madison on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 131-41
(1988); R. Rutland, The Birth of the Bill of Rights: 1776-1791, at 110-12 (1955); Staff of Senate
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1st Sess., Amendments to the Constitution: A Brief Legislative History 4 (Comm. Print 1985).
"7
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past) and on dynamism (not stasis), the common law requires a
method of trial-and-error, a form of experimentation in which judges
attempt to bring the law into harmony with the world it governs. 22
As Justice Holmes expressed it in language appropriate here:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act,
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they
have called into life a being the development of which could not
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters.
It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation. The
case before us must be considered in light of our whole experience
and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago.123
In sum, the common law offers a model for integrating the concerns
for text, history and background principles-the three concerns that
animate the leading schools of constitutional interpretation-but it
does so in a way which supports our thesis about the dynamic and
expansive interpretative implications of the preamble.
C.

JudicialReview and ConstitutionalCommon Law

The dominant theories of constitutional interpretation are all
profoundly normative: they alternately praise and castigate the work
of the courts in light of their own criteria for "proper" constitutional
decision-making. But in assimilating constitutional interpretation to
common-law interpretation we seem to deprive ourselves of any such
norm. For as Legal Realists showed many years ago, 2 4 and as Karl
Llewellyn emphasized in his seminal work on The Common Law Tradition, 25 common-law methods of interpretation are more like advice
than commands, admitting of varied applications and allowing for
reasonable disagreement over outcomes. The result is that commonlaw "rules" of construction do not constitute a precise yardstick
designed to vindicate or castigate constitutional decision-making. But
is that not, however, more of an asset than a liability? We are thus
not offering any litmus test for determining the validity or wisdom of
See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920), quoted in Frankfurter, supra note 32, at
537. Justice Harlan expresses the same idea in these words: "Each new claim to Constitutional
protection must be considered against a background of Constitutional purposes, as they have
been rationally perceived and historically developed." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 544
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124 See, e.g., J. Frank, Law and the Modem Mind (1930); Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed,
3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
125 K. Llewellyn, supra note 97.
122
123
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any of the Court's decisions. We are offering what we believe is a
useful methodology that can hopefully lead to a better constitutional
jurisprudence.
We do not desire to involve ourselves in the controversy that has
raged over the years as. to whether judicial review was contemplated
by the framers or more broadly, whether there should be such review.
We merely note the obvious that a constitution is not self-executing.
Its provisions must be applied to variable and particularized states of
fact. The only organ of government that could authoritatively determine what the words and phrases meant when applied to concrete
states of fact were the courts. And of course this is what happened
from the time of Marshall down to the present date and we don't
believe any member of the present Court would have it otherwise.
Once the need for judicial review is accepted and correlatively it is
recognized that constitutional adjudication will be carried out in the
common-law tradition, it is only to be expected that, as at common
law, reasonable men can reasonably disagree as to the scope and
meaning of the broad and majestic clauses of the charter. When you
apply the technique of inclusion and 'exclusion, contraction and expansion, inescapably the justices and the commentators will -disagree
as to where the lines are to be drawn. To repeat then, when we therefore argue for the interpretative significance of the preamble, we are
not providing any talisman by which the vexing and contentious issues that confront the Court in each one of its terms can automatically be decided. All that we contend is that the preamble provides a
sense of direction which can be of value even though by itself it will
not furnish decisive answers to perplexing questions. This, we repeat,
is the modest office we ascribe to the preamble-modest but nonetheless useful. What we oppose is a blind adherence to a static ideology
which is not responsive to changing conditions and needs and which
ignores the message the preamble is trying to transmit. Because we
believe that split decisions are inevitable, the diversity of views
of
26
Of
1
Court.
the
of
criticism
is
as
welcomed
be
commentators is to
great importance is the vigorous debate among the interpretivists, the
See Justice Stone's eloquent articulation of this point:
I have no patience with the complaint that criticism of judicial action involves any
lack of respect for the courts. When the courts deal, as our do, with great public
questions, the only protection against unwise decisions, and even judicial usurpation, is careful scrutin[y of their action and fearless comment upon it.
H.F. Stone, Forward to 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. at ii.
"Constructive criticism of judicial decisions... is a good thing for the judiciary and for
healthy development of the law.' Only a warped judicial outlook could think ctherwise."
Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Function in Balance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943,
945 (1963).
126
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non-interpretivists and the originalists, unlikely though it is that they
will ever be able to persuade one another. Disagreement has been 2 a7
source of strength and has nourished the common law tradition.
Perhaps the preamble, if heeded, can serve to bridge some of these
differences.
IV.

THE PREAMBLE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION:
SOME APPLICATIONS

At the end of Part II, we argued that the preamble of the Federal
Constitution could play a part in constitutional adjudication through
the Purpose Rule (and the Ambiguity Rule which it subsumes). 12 So
construed, the preamble would be relied upon as evidence of the intent of the framers and the purpose of the document, as well as being
used to shed light on the ambiguous as well as the spacious provisions
of the charter. In this section, we illustrate how such an application
of the preamble might work. Keeping in mind the conclusion of the
previous section that we are not advancing yet another normative theory of constitutional interpretation, our limited aim is merely to show
that the preamble can be a valuable interpretive tool in at least a select
range of cases.

Before turning to the cases, however, we believe we should examine again the words of the preamble itself to see what it may tell us.
We note first that the modest goal of this new experiment in democracy was to form a more perfect union-not to seek the perfection
which is rarely vouchsafed mortal man. Is it not clear that forming a
more perfect union is of necessity a continuous process? What better
proof can there be than that the document being ordained was to be
capable of responding to the changing needs of the people? And implicit in a more perfect union is the establishment of justice-as a
minimum, a guaranty of procedural regularity. In making explicit
that the goal of the Constitution was to promote the general welfare,
is it not plain that the welfare of all and not of the few was to be
advanced?
We come to the most important part of the preamble from our
standpoint-"secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." Liberty was not an abstract ideal to those who had come to
the New World to escape the tyranny of the absolute monarchies of
Europe. They wanted freedom not only for themselves but for their
children and their children's children. They looked to the future as
127
128

K. Llewellyn, supra note 97, at 39, 49 nn.96, 119.
See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
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well as to the present and the past. And so should we. What is especially significant is that their notion of the freedoms to be secured for
their posterity as well as themselves was dynamic and not static. In
short, as lawyers trained in the common law, and applying common
sense to its reading,1 29 the draftsmen knew that the generalities found
in the text could only be particularized by trial and error and by the
traditional methodology of inclusion and exclusion. And it would not
be farfetched to surmise that these lawyers understood that there was
no calibrated instrument by which the inclusions and exclusions were
to be measured just as there was none at common law. They understood the creative role of judges in molding precedents and their underlying principles in resolving, wisely and justly, concrete
controversies based on ever changing sets of facts.130 By the introduction to the body of the charter, they were providing guidance on how
the generalities were to be particularized. Instinct in their words was
that the charter was to be liberally construed.
We turn now to consider some of the controversies that have
occupied the Court over the last eighty-five years.
A.

Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection:A BriefLook at
the Major Cases

The twentieth century has witnessed an unprecedented amount
of litigation involving the liberty and equality interests protected by
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The result has been a long line
of Supreme Court cases striking down or upholding legislation as inconsistent or consistent with the demands of due process or equal protection. Because it is in relation to certain points on this line of cases
that the preamble might have had some bearing, we begin by setting
out in summary form some of the Court's major decisions in these
13
fields.
(A) During this period, the Court, in response to challenges

under the rubrics of due process or equal protection, has upheld legislation: (i) fixing the price of milk; 13 2 (ii) establishing a minimum wage
129 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
130 See A. Cox, Forward to R. Bernstein, Defending the Constitution (1987).

131 For ease of presentation, we have not discriminated between decisions under the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause, or between decisions under the fifth amendment or the fourteenth amendment. Since our concern is with the relevance of the "liberty"
and "general welfare" language of the preamble, we simply want to set out what the Court has
done in these selected areas. In our consideration of particular cases, infra notes 132-54 and
accompanying text, we take account of the particular rationales and constitutional provisions
relied upon by the Court.
132 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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for women; 133 (iii) establishing maximum hours and minimum wages
for workers covered under the Fair Labor Standards Act; 34 (iv) making it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage union membership; 13- (v) establishing a cap on welfare
payments to large families; 136 (vi) providing for the financing of public

school education through property taxes, even though this resulted in
inequalities among school districts; 137 (vii) prohibiting the use 13of
Medicaid funds for abortions not deemed "medically necessary"; 1
139
and (viii) prohibiting consensual homosexual sodomy.
(B) Similarly, during that same period, the Court, usually (but
not always) under the rubrics of equal protection or due process, has
struck down legislation: (i) setting maximum working hours for bakers;'"' (ii) prohibiting transportation in interstate commerce of goods
produced by child labor; 141 (iii) establishing a minimum wage for women; 42 (iv) regulating the price* of gasoline; 143 (v) authorizing the
sterilization of certain criminals; " (vi) segregating public schools by
race; 145 (vii) requiring the payment of a poll tax; 146 (viii) establishing a
residency requirement for receipt of welfare assistance; 147 (ix) denying
state funds for free public education to illegal aliens; 148 (x) prohibiting
the teaching to young children of any modem language other than
English in the schools; 149 (xi) requiring students to attend public
rather than private schools; 150 (xii) providing criminal penalties for
133 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). This case is widely regarded, of
course, as bringing an end to the so-called "Lochner era." See, e.g., R. Rotunda, J. Nowak &
J. Young, supra note 1, at § 15-4; L. Tribe, supra note 1, at § 8-7.
134 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
135 Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
136 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
137 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
138 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
139 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
140 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); this decision was, of course, effectively overruled in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917).
141 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (decided under the Commerce Clause),
overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
142 Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
143 Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
144 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the statute violated a
fundamental interest in having offspring).
145 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
147 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (statute violated a fundamental interest in
travel).
148 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
149 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
150 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

HeinOnline -- 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 150 1990 - 1991

1990]

MATERIALITY OF THE PREAMBLE

the use of contraception by married couples or the giving of advice
and information regarding the same;"'1 (xiii) prohibiting the procurement of an abortion except to save the life of the mother;15 2 (xiv) limiting occupancy of any residence to members of the same "family,"
narrowly defined;1 5 3 and (xv) requiring city contractors to sub-contract a certain portion of their work to minority businesses in a way
not "narrowly" tailored to remedy the effects of prior
discrimination.' 5 4
The conclusion that the course of decision has been inconsistent
is hardly novel. Variations reflect the deep philosophical differences
among the justices both over time and in respect of the composition of
the Court at any one period. These differences are reflected in the
series of quotations set forth above where the insightful passage from
Justice McKenna's opinion in Weems is contrasted with the views of
Justice Sutherland.'5 5
In his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman,5 6 Justice Douglas
lists nine other Justices who would concur in his view that:
When the Framers wrote the Bill of Rights they enshrined in the
form of constitutional guarantees those rights-in part substantive,
in part procedural-which
experience indicated were indispensable
15 7
to a free society.
To his list may be added among the members of the Warren, Burger
and Rehnquist courts the following: Justices Brennan, Goldberg, Fortas, Marshall, Blackmun and Chief Justice Warren. In the Sutherland
group we would include, again from these courts: Justices Black,
White, Scalia, Kennedy, O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
It was not necessary for the first group of Justices to invoke the
preamble in order to reach their decisions which establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the general welfare, secure the
blessings of liberty and implement the goal of moving towards a more
perfect union. The gestalt of the preamble permeates their opinions
despite its not being either referred to or quoted. If the preamble was
given the effect for which we contend, it might have ornamented the
writings of these Justices or altered their rhetoric but as we have said
the results would not have been affected.'5 8
151

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute violated a right to privacy).
113 (1973).
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989).
See supra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Id. at 516 & n.8.
The model opinions that are mindful of the preamble's goals, even though it is not cited,

152 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

153
154
155
156
'57

158
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Our message therefore is directed to the other group of justices.
And our message to this group has essentially three parts:
First, and most generally, we take the preamble to evidence the
elasticity and vitality which the common-law lawyers who drafted the
Constitution must have contemplated. This was the message of Part
III, and it warrants special attention in light of the fact that too many
constitutional scholars and judges now write as though the Constitution were not drafted by lawyers schooled in the tradition described so
well by Cardozo and Llewellyn. Rather, the assumption-undefended and, we believe, insupportable-seems to be that the framers
viewed constitutional language as rigid and static. But could any lawyer in the common-law tradition-familiar with the practice of inclusion and exclusion or with the way words acquire their sense through
successive judicial constructions-hold such an implausible view? If
we are right in Part III, then it is time to acknowledge that a rigid
originalism or literalism enjoys no special place in the pantheon of
constitutional theories by virtue of pedigree.
Second, the preamble's declaration that the document seeks to
secure the "Blessings of Liberty" for future generations of Americans
provides the most persuasive response to a construction of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments as having, in effect, a "suppressed
clause" confining the "liberty" which they protect to those interests
explicitly mentioned elsewhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights.
Yet the amendments contain no such explicit constraint; and surely
there is no warrant for reading one in when the stated goal of the
document as a whole is the protection of "Liberty," per se, and not
merely the protection of some particular and narrow class of
liberties. 59
Finally, we think that the preamble's declaration of the supreme
importance of the "general welfare" demands that the document's
are Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe, 367 U.S. at 522, Justice Douglas' dissent in the same case,
id. at 509, Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986); see
also Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 3 (1988).
159 A sizable stretch of time, of course, divides the drafters of the preamble from the drafters of the fourteenth amendment; yet there are two reasons why that later amendment should
rightly be seen in light of the preamble: (i) it is an amendment to a preexisting document which
begins with the preamble, and thus has come to be a part of the whole which is the Constitution, and whose values are those expressed in the preamble; and while the fourteenth amendment may, indeed, have signalled a rethinking of the constitutional structure of federalism,
there is no reason to think it represented a retreat from the Founders' commitment to "liberty"; (ii) the fourteenth amendment follows, of course, much of the language of the fifth
amendment; and surely there would be no question about the propriety of construing the latter
in light of the preamble; why then should language as restated and applied to citizens of the
states now be exempt from such guidance?
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other provisions be construed in a manner always consistent with this
end. Note that we do not argue here that any independent, substantive significance be accorded the "general welfare" language; 6 ° all we
argue is that it be accorded interpretive significance, so that particular
provisions elsewhere in the document should be interpreted in a way
consonant with this general objective.
B.

Privacy, Liberty and the Sodomy Statute

Defying the earlier predictions of some commentators that the
Court would expand rights of autonomy and privacy in sexual matters, 61 the Supreme Court in 1986 denied that there was a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, 62 and upheld Georgia's
prohibitory sodomy statute. 63 The most important features of the
majority opinion by Justice White were: (i) its narrowing of the issue
to whether there was a right to engage in homosexual sodomy; (ii) its
abrupt dismissal of the relevance of the Court's long line of "privacy"
decisions; and (iii) its admonitions concerning judicial cognizance of
rights not textually based on specific words of the Constitution.
Most striking about the majority opinion, as well as Chief Justice
Burger's concurrence,'" was the obsessive focus on "homosexuality"--even though the statute forbade all sodomy. 165 As Justice
Blackmun noted in his dissent:
This case is no more about a "fundamental right to engage in
homosexual sodomy," as the Court purports to declare, ante, at
191, than Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was about a fundamental right to watch obscene movies, or Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), was about a fundamental right to place interstate bets from a telephone booth. Rather, this case is about "the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civi-

lized men," namely, "the right to be let alone." Olmstead v. United
160 Thus, we do not intend to dispute or run afoul of the Court's decision in United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
161 See, e.g., Grey, Eros, Civilization and the Burger Court, 43 Law & Contemp. Probs. 83,
97 (1980).
162 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
163 Id. The prohibitions of the statute were not confined to only homosexual sodomy. This,
and other peculiar procedural features of the case, are not our primary concern here. For
criticism of the Court on these matters, see, Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 648 (1987).
164 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
165 See, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 1, at § 15-21, at 1431 ("the gravamen of Hardwick's offense was the physical act he performed, not the gender of the person with whom he performed
it, since the statute defines the crime of sodomy solely by reference to which parts of the
anatomy may not come into contact").
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States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).'"
By pitching the issue at the level of specificity which it did, the majority eased its burden of distinguishing the Court's prior line of privacy
decisions:' 67 "No connection between family, marriage, or procreation [the putative subject of the prior decisions] on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated ... *"16
Going on to note that to say a right to engage in homosexual
sodomy "is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's, history and tradition' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious," ' 69
Justice White admonished that, "[tihe Court itself is most vulnerable
and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or
design of the Constitution."17 0
This type of rigid interpretivism (which seemingly is at war with
Justice White's concurrence in Griswold) 17 1 would freeze the liberty
interests which the preamble sought to secure.1 72 The Constitution
says nothing about a "right to privacy," let alone about contraceptives
or the teaching of foreign languages. Yet Justice McReynolds, hardly
a proponent of judge-made constitutional law having no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution, had no difficulty
in Meyer 173 and Pierce174 in upholding liberty interests not specifically defined by the Constitution. It is worth pausing to recall the
controlling passage in his opinion:
While this Court has not attempted to define with exactness
the liberty thus guaranteed [by the fourteenth amendment], the
term has received much consideration and some of the included
things have been definitely stated. Without doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
166 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167 Identified by the Court, Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190, as: Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
168 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191. In dissent, Justice Blackmun replied that: "We protect those
rights [e.g. marriage, procreation] not because they contribute, in some direct and material
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's
life." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.

170 Id.
171 381 U.S. 479, 502 (1965).

172 See, e.g., Grey, supra note 57.
173 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
174 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and
bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men....
...

Plaintiff in error taught [the German] language in school

as part of his occupation. His right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their
children, we think, are
175
within the liberty of the Amendment.

It is interesting to note that, years before the disputes about incorporation or Justice Black's attacks on substantive due process, the conservative McReynolds was able to see the "liberty" of the fourteenth
amendment as encompassing a host of enumerated and nonenumerated freedoms-as well as to appreciate the common-law pedigree of
many of these protections and the relevance of that to a proper construal of the clause.176 But if as Justice White suggests that absent
explicit constitutional enumeration, the protection of any freedom by
the Court represents an insupportable usurpation of legislative authority by the judiciary, a great many of the Court's precedents are in
jeopardy as are our basic freedoms.
But how could such a position be seriously maintained if the preamble was accorded its proper office? In a document established in
order to secure "the blessings of liberty"-not some liberties, not just
enumerated liberties, but "liberty" itself-what warrant can there be
for confining its protections within the rubrics which Justice White
accepts? If there is a burden of proof here, surely it falls on those who
would deny the dynamic and expansive implications of the preamble.
Such considerations also bear on the decision in Hardwick 177 itself. Consider, for example, how Professor Tribe frames the issue:
The proper question, as the dissent in Hardwick recognized, is not
whether oral sex as such [the "sodomy" at issue] has long enjoyed

a special place in the pantheon of constitutional rights, but whether
private, consensual, adult sexual acts partake of traditionally re-8

vered liberties of intimate association and individual autonomy. 17
In other words, following Tribe, we may ask: are the "liberties of inti175 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400 (citations omitted).
176 See also, Barak, Constitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary,
40 B. of the Int'l A. of Jewish Laws. & Jurists 12 (1989). McReynold's "right of the individual
to contract," Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, has, of course, not survived in the pantheon of liberties.
But surely such evolution of the general notion of "liberty" is to be expected over the course of
a constitutional common law.
177 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
178 L. Tribe, supra note 1, at § 15-21, at 1428.
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mate association and individual autonomy" protected by the Constitution? Given the untenability of a cramped reading of liberty-a
conclusion which follows from reading the fourteenth amendment in
light of the preamble as argued above--the answer should be selfevident. For once the interpretive debate is freed from the shackles of
unwarranted literalism, it is surely reasonable that a society that cherishes the Blessings of Liberty ought, among other things, to shelter
the right of individuals to participate in the privacy of their bedroom
in consensual sexual activity of their choosing.
C. Liberty or Privacy? Rethinking Griswold
79
Prior to the setback in Bowers v. Hardwick,1
a long line of cases
has recognized a multitude of liberty interests, often under a variety of
rubrics, most notably (and recently) "privacy." 1 0 Yet while this
course of decision has often been commendable, the rhetoric of the
authors of decisions in which much of this jurisprudence has developed has produced unnecessary controversy. Griswold v. Connecticut 'l is perhaps the best example of this problem, and the Bork
hearings were only the most recent evidence of the controversy it has
engendered. While not many people would care to see the decision
itself overturned, few are happy with Justice Douglas's reasoning.
Here the preamble could have performed a useful role by suggesting a
more principled foundation for the actual decision. Before considering the preamble's relevance in this regard, it is worth recounting the
problems with Justice Douglas's approach.
After citing and discussing very briefly a range of cases 18 2 that
were supposed to illustrate that the Bill of Rights also protected "peripheral rights" without which "the specific rights would be less secure,"' 8 3 Justice Douglas concluded that: "The foregoing cases
suggest that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."'' 8 4 It was
this mysterious language about "penumbras," "peripheral rights,"
179 Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186.
180 See Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394

U.S. 618 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); supra notes

144, 147, 149-52 and accompanying text.
181 381 U.S. 479.
182 See, e.g., Meyer, 262 U.S. 390; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);

NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957);

Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
183 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
184 Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
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"zones" and "emanations"--combined with the absence of explicit
textual support for this right of privacy-that brought a storm of controversy down upon Griswold. As Professor Paul Kauper noted in his
well-know commentary on the decision, Justice Douglas's "unusually
short opinion... combined a curious, puzzling mixture of reasoning
I
with extraordinary freedom in the interpretation of earlier cases. "85
The opinion was "ambiguous and uncertain in its use of the specifics
of the Bill of Rights to invalidate the Connecticut statute"'8 6 and, as
Kauper justifiably concluded, a "labored attempt to identify18the
right
7
Rights.1
of
Bill
the
of
specifics
the
with
privacy
of marital
Griswold, of course, could have been decided less controversially:
the paradigm, in fact, for such a decision was even available in the
form of Justice Harlan's eloquent and careful dissent in Poe v. Ullman.1 88 It is worth recalling, then, the key parts of Justice Harlan's
dissent. After observing that, "[i]t is but a truism to say that... [the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment] is not self-explanatory, 1 89 and after reviewing the debate surrounding that clauses'
proper office, Justice Harlan observed that:
Again and again this Court has resisted the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment is no more than a shorthand reference to what
is explicitly set out elsewhere in the Bill of Rights....
...
[The full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of
the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. 90
With this expansive view of the fourteenth amendment established,
Justice Harlan went on to make out his case that "the [Connecticut]
statute marks an abridgement of important fundamental liberties piotected by the Fourteenth Amendment"1 91 as it would require "the intrusion of the whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart
1 92
of martial privacy."
What then would recourse to the preamble add to this line of
185 Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 235, 242 (1965).
186 Id. at 244.
187 Id. at 252.
188 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Poe, the issue of the constitutional-

ity of the same Connecticut statute at issue in Griswold was never reached because a majority
of the Court found there was no justiciable question. (The plaintiffs had sought a declaratory
judgment; they, unlike the Gtiaold plaintiffs, had not been prosecuted under the statute.)
189 Id. at 540.

190 Id. at 541, 543.
191 Id. at 554.
192 Id. at 553.
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reasoning? In our earlier discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick,193 we
have already suggested the answer: for the greatest obstacle to the
fourteenth amendment jurisprudence typified by Harlan's Poe dissent' 94 or Douglas's conclusions in Griswold 19' is the resistance to an
expansive reading of the "liberty" of the Due Process Clause. But
that resistance should melt away were the preamble given the interpretative significance for which we contend-for it is the "Blessings of
Liberty" for the present and the future without qualification and
without limitation that are to be secured for all of our people. If we
consider further that the common-law lawyers who drafted the Constitution understood, as we argued earlier, 196 that the meaning of
terms evolve in the course of adjudication, then it seems entirely implausible that no human freedom is to be protected unless it is specifically enumerated in the Constitution or its amendments! Justice
Harlan's Poe dissent, 197 suggests a framework in which Griswold1 9
and other decisions might have been recast as a decision about "liberty" instead of "privacy." Such a change would hardly silence all
critics, but it would, at least, put some of the Court's Due Process
jurisprudence on a surer path, one accented by the preamble itself. 199
D.

Child Labor and the New Deal Cases

Unlike most of the cases mentioned in Section A, above, the
Child Labor case 2°O and the later "New Deal" cases 2° 1 were decided
under the Commerce Clause and not under the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clauses. Nonetheless, they present in a stark way issues to
which the preamble speaks: for in all of these cases the federal government was found to lack power under the Commerce Clause to pass
193
194
195
196

478 U.S. 186 (1986); see supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
See supra notes 109-23 and accompanying text.

197 Poe, 367 U.S. at 544.
198 Griswold, 381 U.S. 479.
199 None of this, of course, speaks to the so-called "double standards" problem-namely,
the modem court's special concern for personal and social liberties and its indifference to
economic liberties (e.g. the "liberty" to contract). But we think the "liberty" of the preamble
and of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is a perfect example of a general term that common-law lawyers would expect to evolve in the course of successive adjudications and judicial
constructions. Calling this evolution a matter of "double standards" presupposes-wronglythat absent a timeless yardstick, there can be no basis for adjudication. But how would any
area of the common law fare under such a demand? Is it really a "double standard" when
social and judicial sensibilities evolve in such a way that "liberty" contracts along one dimension and expands along another?
200 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
201 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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legislation bearing on what should rightly be classed "the general welfare." In Hammer v. Dagenhart,°2 the federal government was denied the power to prohibit interstate commerce in the products of
child labor and in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. ,203 the power to fix coal
prices and establish the right to collective bargaining for miners. In
these cases two themes predominated in the majority opinions: the
necessity of preserving the distinction between the realms of federal
and state control (the dual sovereignty theory); 201 and the distinction,
purportedly central to the Commerce Clause, between interstate
"commerce" on the one hand and the actual "productive" activities
on the other (regardless of where their products ended. up or their
effects on interstate commerce). The former was, of course, subject to
federal regulation; the latter was a matter for purely local control.
There was and is, no doubt, a certain theoretical appeal to the
conceptual tidiness of the majority approach in these cases. And it is
similarly tempting to view their overruling not as a matter of more
enlightened constitutional interpretation, but as simply a pragmatic
decision by the Court to sanction the federal legislative usurpation of
power. Regardless of the Court's motive in departing from this line of
decisions, 205 however, it is still permissible to ask whether a plausible
construction of the Constitution, taking account of its preamble,
would not have admitted different holdings in the cases at issue.
The central issue is perhaps posed most distinctly by Justice
Sutherland's majority opinion in Carter.'6 According to Justice
Sutherland:
the powers which Congress undertook to exercise are not specific
but of the most general character-namely, to protect the general
public interest and the health and comfort of the people, to conserve privately-owned coal, maintain just relations between producers and employees and others, and promote the general welfare,
by controlling nation-wide production and distribution of coal.
These, it may be conceded, are objects of great worth; but are they
ends, the attainment of which has been committed by the Constitution to the federal government?2 "7
That, of course, is precisely the interpretive question posed by this
line of cases; but the choice is not simply between ignoring the Consti202 247 U.S. 251.
203 298 U.S. 238.
204 See, e.g., L. Tribe, supra note 1, at § 5-6 at 311 n.1.
205 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,

301 U.S. 1 (1937).

206 Carter, 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
207

Id. at 290-91.
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tution and upholding the legislation or reading the Commerce Clause,
as these cases did, to prohibit such legislation. Rather, the question is
what the interpretationof.the Constitution really shows. According to
Justice Sutherland in Carter it shows that:
the powers which the general government may exercise are only
those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied
powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers....
[S]ince every addition to the national legislative power to
some extent detracts from or invades the power of the states, it is of
vital moment that, in order to preserve the fixed balance intended
by the Constitution, the powers of the general government be not
so extended as to embrace any not within the express terms of the
several grants or the implications necessarily to be drawn
therefrom....
...

As used in the Constitution, the word "commerce" is the
equivalent of the phrase "intercourse for the purposes of trade,"
and includes transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities between the citizens of the different states....
That commodities produced or manufactured within a state
are intended to be sold or transported outside the state does not
render their production or manufacture subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause.2 °8
208

Id. at 291, 294-95, 298, 301. And similarly, Justice Day in Hammer:
In interpreting the Constitution it must never be forgotten that the Nation is
made up of States to which are entrusted the powers of local government. And to
them and to the people the powers not expressly delegated to the National Government are reserved....

In our view the necessary effect of this act is, by means of a prohibition
against the movement in interstate commerce of ordinary commercial commodities, to regulate the hours of labor of children in factories and mines within the
States, a purely state authority. Thus the act in a twofold sense is repugnant to the
Constitution. It not only transcends the authority delegated to Congress over
commerce but also exerts a power as to a purely local matter to which the federal
authority does not extend.... [I]f
Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to
local authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in interstate commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power of the States over
local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government be practically
destroyed.
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275-76 (1918).
The insertion of the word "expressly" before "delegated" by Justice Day and Justice Sutherland's reference to "specifically enumerated" and "express terms" are to be contrasted with
Chief Justice Marshall's observation in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406
(1819): "But there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation...
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In Sutherland's opinion-which is typical of many others of that
period-it is clear that the guiding interpretive consideration was the
maintenance of the federal system as conceived circa 1789. That
background interpretive assumption explains why the Court, in Hammer at least, invalidated a statute that was, on its face, constitutional. 20 9 Still, if the narrow construal of "interstate commerce"-to
the exclusion of any regulation of commercial activity which might
only have effects on interstate commerce (the key notion of the later
decisions) 2 '°--was predicated on a particular interpretive assumption
(about federalism) it remains to be seen whether equally compelling
and legitimate interpretive considerations might not point in the other
direction. Put more simply: are the Carter211 and Hammer 21 2 readings viable if the Commerce Clause is read together with the
preamble?
The Constitution, which established the federal government, established that government, in part, to "promote the general welfare"
and to "form a more perfect union," that is, to create a nation and not
merely an aggregation of states. In construing the power conferred by
the Commerce Clause, the Court was presented, in fact, with a paradigm case for consulting the preamble. The real issue was whether
the power conferred was to be construed broadly or narrowly: should
it include the power to regulate only that which was literally "interstate commerce" or could it include the power to regulate all that
which bears on or affects such commerce. The natural inference is
that the power to regulate interstate commerce should be construed so
as to promote the general welfare,21 3 particularly at a time when the
nation was in the throes of a great depression and only the national
authority could cope with the problems it presented. 2 4 This does not
requires that every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described. Even the 10th
amendment... omits the word 'expressly'...." Id.
209 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 277 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the statute in question is within the
power expressly given to Congress if considered only as to its immediate effects").
210 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
211 Carter, 298 U.S. 238.
212 Hammer, 247 U.S. 251.
213 We do not want to suggest (as we have noted above) that under the rubric of "general
welfare" anything goes. Yet the contrary position, which would accord no significance to this
language, is untenable: the "general welfare" is one of the Constitution's stated objectives, and
as such it is entitled to interpretive weight when appropriate. We would stake out a middle
position, a position for which the New Deal cases discussed in the text are paradigmatic: for
the extraordinary economic debacle of the Great Depression presents a case in which the "general welfare" of the nation was surely at stake; in such a situation, to give no significance to
this fundamental constitutional objective would be to ignore inexplicably and inexcusably the
guidance offered by the preamble.
214 Presumably the framers had learned from their experience under the Articles of Confed-
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suggest that any and all regulations are permissible;" 5 but it can at
lease warrant the conclusion of the Court in Jones & Laughlin2 6 and
Wickard 2 17 that intrastate activities which have certain sorts of "ef-

fects"---either in reality or potentially in aggregate-on interstate
commerce are subject to federal control-to the extent, of course, that
they affect the "general welfare" and are tailored to the promotion of
such welfare. But it is not hard to imagine how the regulation of child
labor 21 8 or the regulation of particular industries during a time of national economic crisis 2 19 could be amply justified by considerations of
the "general welfare. ' 220 Justice Sutherland conceded as much in
Carter,22 ' yet he treated an outdated conception of federalism as the
governing interpretive consideration-and, of course, ignored the preamble as a source of guidance.
It is worth concluding here with Justice Story's observation that:
a constitution of government, founded by the people for themselves
and their posterity, and for objects of the most momentous nature,
for perpetual union, for the establishment of justice, for the general
welfare, and for a perpetuation of the blessings of liberty, necessarily requires that every interpretation of its powers should have a
constant reference to these objects. No interpretation of the words
in which those powers are granted can be a sound one which narrows down their ordinary import so as to defeat those objects.222
Story had better access to and knowledge of the framers' intent than
Meese, Bork or alas Justice Sutherland and his followers. Is it conceivable that the framers, having experienced the impotence of the
government created by the Articles of Confederation, would have
contemplated that both the states and the national government would
be powerless to cope with the collapse of the economy occurring during the Great Depression or that new forms of freedom could be denied their posterity because they had thought it wise to frame their
purposes, goals and values in general rather than in specific terms?
eration that without national control of some form, a common market, indeed, even a "more
perfect union," would be impossible.
215 Some regulations might touch matters with no bearing on interstate commerce; and
some matters, even if having a bearing on interstate commerce, have no relevance to the general welfare.
216 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
217 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
218 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
219 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
220 But see supra notes 213-15.
221 Carter, 298 U.S. 238.
222 J.Story, supra note 13, at § 422.
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The preamble accorded the effect to which it is legally entitled at a
minimum would be helpful in resolving these basic questions.
V.

CONCLUSION

If the preamble to the Constitution were given the status we advocate, the course of our constitutional jurisprudence would not
change drastically. However, we submit that the preamble merits recognition as a genuine interpretive aid in construing the Constitution's
provisions. Moreover, these provisions, as we have also argued,
should be construed dynamically, as they would at common law.
Viewing the Constitution as the foundation of a constitutional common law accords well with the views of the framers and the earliest
interpreters of the document as well as with the actual course of our
constitutional history. Against that backdrop of. constitutional theory, the preamble does not demand that a single construction be put
on the Constitution; rather it serves as a signpost, marking the course
of constitutional common law, and demanding that, whatever the particular course, the Constitution should in the end serve to "establish
Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
' '223
ourselves and our Posterity.
223

U.S. Const. preamble.
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